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INTRODUCTION
Passenger transport in many countries is the subject of major review. The winds of
change vary in strength; in some contexts there is thorough-going reform centred
on the role of the market either as the ultimate arbiter of efficient service provision
or in "joint venture" with public intervention, leading to competitive tendering. The
introduction of actual or potential competition has sometimes been accompanied by
actual or planned privatisation.  Other reforms have adopted the words rather than
the substance of more radical policies.
The Second international conference on privatisation and deregulation held in
Tampere (Finland) in July 1991 continued the theme of the first conference in
Australia (Hensher 1991), building on the recommendations to broaden out the
debate on the role of surface public transport to incorporate rail transport and the
automobile. Six workshops were assembled to capture the dimensions of the reform
process:
1. experience with competitive tendering,
2. understanding competition and anti-trust behaviour,
3. externalities, public interest and private good,
4. management, institutional structures, the transportation planning process
and the future of passenger transport,
5. road pricing and private financing, and
6. experience with corporatisation, deregulation and privatisation of
    public transport.
Some very strong messages evolved from discussions in the workshops and
plenary sessions.  Most notable is the important role that this conference series can
2play in the evolution of constructive interchange between the theoretical cases for
different types of change and the experiences with alternative interpretations of
markets and intervention.  In this, the conference was the richer for the participation
of a significant number of experienced operators.
Seven broad themes emerged out of the four days of discussion. The emergent
themes are:
1. The continuing debate on the role of the market and alternative forms of
intervention
2. Progress in contracting and tendering, centred on a detailed diagnosis of a
number of emerging models known by their original country of development
(the UK, NZ, New South Wales and Swedish models).
3. The development of a framework for modal rivalry, with particular attention
given to transport pricing, especially road congestion pricing and user-side
subsidies for public transport and their alternatives.
4. Influencing the conduct of service supply by emphasis on ex ante or ex post
strategies in competition policy. The problems identified include the power to
dismantle entry barriers and building credible penalties for mis-behaviour.
5. New ways to encourage competitive efficiency. These include promoting
rivalry by functional separation of common servicing (e.g. inter-modal
ticketing); a focus on property development and value capture (notably for the
railways); the allocation of land and the role of zoning constraints as part of a
broader strategy on pricing and investment; and the privatisation of planning
(e.g. the use of consultants and operator associations in the conduct of the
tendering process or the development of social criteria for policy).
6. The political acceptability of reform agendas:  the identification of strategies
which give the emerging debate on reforms improved prospects of being
translated into effective action is central for example to the future of road
congestion pricing and user-side subsidies.
7. Management training for incumbents and potential entrants as an essential
element of the information disclosure process: the case for including minimum
requirements in the legislation for change.
COMPETITION POLICY
As nations open up their transportation systems to competitive forces, be it by
economic deregulation or competitive tendering, the effectiveness of competition as
a weapon of productive and allocative efficiency comes under increasing scrutiny.
Equally, the role and performance of competitive agencies in ensuring competition
become critical.  Most existing competition policies have both ex ante and ex post
elements, on the one hand setting conditions which encourage competition (e.g.
disallowing proposed mergers)  and on the other mandating changes in revealed
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whether current policies are effective in either dimension.  They may neither
prevent objectionable behaviour nor provide sufficient disincentives to embark on it.
The UK experience illuminates the problem. Competition policy there can do little to
affect the entry conditions which determine the degree of competition, so it is not an
effective ex ante instrument.  On the other hand, its ability to punish objectionable
behaviour lacks, for example, the US sanctions of severe financial penalties.  So it
is not an effective ex post instrument.
Reform can be directed at strengthening either aspect.  The conference considered
particularly ex ante instruments, especially the use of legislative reform designed to
eliminate barriers to actual entry in the case of economic deregulation or to
encourage potential competition in the case of competitive tendering.  On the
reasonable assumption that modes are unique ("buses are different") an ex ante
strategy may involve the construction of rules for market conduct specific to a
mode.  Examples are an Office of Bus (OFBUS) or an Office of Rail (OFRAIL). This
kind of ex ante strategy has however the potential to invite "capture". It requires
specialists in the industry to be "independent" regulators. Such expertise has
tended to be drawn from the industry. The self-regulation model currently
implemented in some countries (e.g NSW, Australia) is one such example.
Thus, the relative emphasis on ex post and ex ante strategies will require
assessment in the context of each nations existing capability and the degree to
which reform should involve specialisation in pro-competitive agencies.
PROGRESS IN CONTRACTING AND TENDERING
As a conservative response to pressures to use the market as the final arbiter of
optimal service supply, competitive tendering is being introduced systematically
throughout a growing number of countries. The tendering philosophy is diversifying
into many interpretations or "models" of the tendering process. The most widely
implemented model is the UK model which, in London, emphasises cost-only
contracts and, outside of London, bottom-line or minimum subsidy contracts.
Outside London tendering is confined to situations where commercial provision of
services has not followed economic deregulation.
Recent developments in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden offer alternative
models. The Australian model introduced into NSW in the 1990 NSW Passenger
Transport Act is a major variation. It emphasises the need to ensure that the
incumbent operators in the private sector are given a 5-year period to satisfy the
minimum levels of service. This is essentially a recognition of the historical
contribution of the incumbents who have territorial monopolies. The NSW model is
described fully in the paper by Graham.
The NSW model is characterised by a competitive franchising procedure which
guarantees the supply of services by a single operator in a predefined spatial
context. The spatial area is in the main the prior historical allocation. All incumbents
are given the first opportunity to conform with the service requirements, leaving
undefined the precise routings to be adopted.The service standards have to be
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density and car ownership rates. The services provided of a commercial nature are
supplied jointly with the provision of school services whose costs are reimbursed
under a "school subsidy travel scheme" (SSTS). If an operator chooses not to
provide the (minimum) level of service specified under the Act, then the services
will be put out to competitive tender. An incumbent can opt immediately to withdraw
or can use the 5-year period of grace to make all efforts to conform to the minimum
levels of service. Holding the subsidy constant, the minimum service level initially
suggests more value for money where services have to be upgraded.
The interpretation of "competition" by the private operators is interesting. It is
argued that "actual" competition exists in two ways. First there is competition from
other modes (which is a common source of competition in all models). Second,
operators "compete" between themselves to establish superior performance in the
supply of service. This is analogous to the Beesley- Hensher model of managerial
competition in the provision of tolled private roads (Beesley and Hensher 1990).
The claim that the operators compete for the same passengers is controversial. If it
can be shown that one operator can compete away the customers of an operator on
a different route because of superior service then this can be interpreted as spatial
competition. It is clearly not the same as "head-on" competition.
One of the great challenges facing the NSW model is establishing the criteria for
defining and updating standards over time as populations change. Linked in with
this is monitoring which will provide the necessary data to enable determination of
conformation with the Act. Over time this may provide an example of regulatory
failure.
The New Zealand model, discussed in detail in papers by Wallis and Knight and
briefly in Cox and Love, is modelled on the UK 1985 legislation as applied outside
London. It is broader in that it embraces all passenger transport modes. Although
promoted as "deregulation" the NZ approach evolved as part of the process leading
up to the commencement of the Act on 1 July 1991.  It is much more akin to
competitive tendering with procedural variations.  Commercial registration is
permitted but unlike the UK model, there are a number of planning instruments
which act as negative incentives to commercial registration. The consequence is a
predominance of minimum-subsidy tenders. All contracts are for areas and not
individual routes. Regional Councils can substantially influence the setting of
service and fare levels, and are able to preclude commercial services to secure
desired service and fare policies. The latter contrasts with the UK model in which
the bottom-line tender is a "last resort" facility, adapted to what the commercial
market reveals.  Incumbents may receive a non-mandatory price preference up to
25% prior to July 1992 and then up to 12.5% up to June 1993. Any single
application of this rule requires its application to be extended equitably to all
existing operators in the area under the jurisdiction of a Regional Council.
In the transitional stage, The NZ model has been modified continually in order to
minimise "disruption" to incumbent bus operators. A fixed infrastructure subsidy is
paid to incumbent rail and ferry operators. The initial result of the procedures laid
down is a 16% reduction in subsidy with very little change to the overall provision of
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There was broad agreement that a distinction must be made between the
transitional and longer term impacts of competitively and non-competitively based
reforms. Whether the appropriate incentives are in place to ensure real efficiency
gains in the longer term application of competitive tendering/franchising remains to
be proven. The priority on the development of comprehensive performance
monitoring procedures is becoming clearer as more heterogeneity occurs in the
reform procedures. The NZ model is the most "comprehensive" and also the most
unwieldy. The NSW model is very conservative but identifiable. In both cases, the
desire to protect the incumbent is paramount.
The conference recommended a continuing effort to separate responsibility for
policy from the responsibility for providing services. One caveat is in order however;
whether the market (by free entry) or planners (by controlled entry) should
determine the nature of service is an issue of continuing debate. There is a growing
view that the competitive tendering process should be broadened to encompass
tendering for specification (the "architecture model") and tendering for planning
provision.
ROAD PRICING AND USER-SIDE SUBSIDIES
The recognition of the role of prices in delivering efficient signals has existed for
many years. In two contexts, road congestion pricing and public transport (provider-
side) subsidies, the political acceptability of efficient (social) user charges has been
a barrier to their implementation.  One non-political barrier has recently been
essentially removed - the technological barrier of road pricing. Electronic road
pricing as a feasible option is described in the paper by Hills and Blythe. It is up to
the political process to introduce a regime of efficient economic charges across all
surface modes. The literature on road pricing has become confused with the
literature on road financing where the latter concentrates at present on the role of
the private sector in building, owning, operating and transferring road infrastructure.
Tolls on selective roads are not a systemwide pricing system but are simply a
means of raising revenue to provide a return on the private sectors investment.
Government has a perverse incentive in supporting road pricing as argued in the
paper by Evans 1991 because as a monopolist it can raise a tax. The proper role of
government as an agency is to aid the introduction of a tax and thus should be tax
neutral.
However it is the crisis in road financing that has given road pricing its greatest
chance of being implemented (with the proviso that the early introduction of urban
tollways will provide beneficial examples of the success of a scheme of direct
charges). By linking road pricing with the issues of financing, it is likely to assist in
facilitating entry into the road business. The auction price associated with
facilitating entry should reflect congestion pricing (i.e. tolls representing efficient
economic charges). Aligned to the challenge of political acceptability is the
demonstration that road pricing is compatible with the notion of sustainable
development.
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shares. Lee suggests that in the USA context its major impact is on the occupancy
of automobiles. This will affect the efficiency of the road system, but not via an
increase in the demand for public transport. Road congestion pricing however
should be evaluated in the broader context of pricing of all surface modes. Most
notably we must recognise the under-pricing of urban public transport and the
absence of efficiency and equity in a fare structure that is subsidised for the benefit
of all users rather than users with genuine disadvantage.
The conference re-opened the 1970's debate on the role of user-side subsidies as
an alternative to provider-side subsidies. One of the important tasks in achieving
political acceptability is to identify the effects of user-side subsidies relative to the
current system of provider-side subsidies. If all provider-side subsidies are shifted
into user-side subsidies, what will be the predicted change in the patterns of service
by mode. Three groups of travellers in particular have to be assessed - the elderly,
the disabled and the children. The co-location issue will be important; user-side
subsidies may well boost some routes but at the expense of other routes. It is
predictable that this shift will have income effects and may increase car ownership.
The prediction of effects is the first thing politically that has to be settled if a case
for politically acceptable user -side subsidies is to be mounted.
Another competitive tendering strategy which emerged during the conference is
bidding on the "lowest fare for a given minimum level of service". This model has
positive incentives in respect of patronage although one has to recognise the
possibility of overcrowding. To counter suggestions that differential fares for
"equivalent" service between franchised areas has equity implications, it is argued
that distributive justice in the provision of public transport can be achieved by other
means. The critical issue is to ensure that services in one location are provided at
the efficient cost given minimum levels of service.  Any case for equity may be
better accommodated by user-side subsidies. Thus this new tendering criterion
reinforces the value of moving away from provider-side subsidies to user- side
subsidies, which is fully compatible with incentive contracting associated with both
productive and allocative efficiency and the separation of equity reconciliation.For
example, in the context of any review of School Subsidy Travel Scheme in NSW
this must be an attractive alternative, enabling both the operator to establish
unambiguous financial obligations for the supply of services and the regulator to
have a clear mandate to service the user.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Innovation in institutions to assist in establishing the political acceptability of major
reform is essential. Many solidly based ideas have floundered in the past because
of a poor specification of the scope and functions for the institutions to execute the
ideas.  Road pricing, for example, creates such a challenge, even when the
questions of purpose, discussed earlier, have been resolved.  Such a road price or
tax will typically be collected over several urban jurisdictions and cut across
established responsibilities for road quality.  Yields will depend on collateral
policies designed to keep roads clear.  The money raised is the potential basis for
cooperation, but keeping yields high involves different authorities spending varying
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paying;  insofar as these are conceded, the revenues raised fall and the efficiency
of the system declines.  There will be competing claimants for shares of the
proceeds.  Each country will have to find its own particular solution to funding a
viable institution.  The conference felt that, after 30 years of economic analysis of
road pricing, analytical skills should now be focused on these practical matters of
organisational design.
The growth in contracting and tendering for transport services prompted the
conference to consider how the principle involved could be extended to other areas
of transport planning.  The principle is to apply to a given function the test - must it
be done in-house, or can it be put out to tender, and thus harness market forces to
improve performance?  A particular opportunity was seen for planning authorities to
make use of the large pool of consultancy skills which has grown up in the area of
transport planning.  This was linked to two needs in particular - the development of
practical criteria which could justify the allocation of subsidies to alternative modes
and services in response to social needs, and devising and exercising the improved
performance measures for transit authorities discussed earlier.  Why not, the
conference asked, employ consultants on incentive contracts to carry out these
functions, as had already been done for many years in transit vehicle operations?
A certain amount of relevant experience was reported at the conference.  It was
recognised that extending the role of consultancy in this way represented a
considerable challenge not only to the authorities concerned but also the
consultants themselves.  In particular, the transition from adviser to management
responsibility, necessarily involving risks, was seen as extremely demanding in the
functions now being considered, which involve close interaction with political
agendas.  Nevertheless, it was agreed that this was an area well worth exploring
further.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
Underlying the conference debate on improving the efficiency of transit firms was
the recognition of the need for a practical but well founded set of measures of
performance. Improving the productivity of a transit authority is central to the
challenge to lower costs in a way that is consistent with improving efficiency,
eliminating subsidy or limiting subsidy to services which are identified as genuine
community service obligations (CSO's), and in ultimately providing profits (or
"dividends") to the stakeholders.
Transit enterprises need a set of quantitative indicators to track performance in
detail sufficient to identify the real sources of gain (or loss) in overall productivity.
These measures should be more than ex post monitors, they should have the
capability of providing ex ante guidance on what to do to improve productivity. In
establishing a set of indicators, it is recognised that their usefulness will be gauged
by whether they can show positive or negative differences between the transit
operation and other enterprises. There is a growing recognition of the comparability
of performance measures across all government trading enterprises (GTE's) and
8where possible the inclusion of private enterprises as a useful benchmark.
Any measure of performance must be capable of measurement at many levels
within an organisation, notably at the route level, such that it can be aggregated to
any desired level for suitable comparisons (e.g. depot comparisons, division
comparisons). Furthermore there must be a capability to map these indicators to
operational measures to enable management to improve performance in line with
pre-specified targets.
A focus of discussion was the development of an overall measure of productivity to
provide a single index for comparisons between levels of activity within the transit
firm and for contrasts with other GTE's. One particular measure having growing
acceptance in the Treasuries of State and Federal governments, is total factor
productivity (TFP). Partial measures of productivity (typically referred to as
performance indicators) may seriously misstate productivity differences across time
and between enterprises.
The essential elements of performance measurement  identified were:
1. To rationalise clearly the need to adopt a particular approach to performance
measurement as a suitable way of establishing a reference benchmark for
comparisons within a transit firm and between it and other GTE's and private
businesses.
2. To set out the data requirements necessary to obtain sound quantitative
measures of performance at various desirable levels of disaggregation (for
example, the route, route cluster, depot and division).
3. To quantify the performance measures for a transit firm.
4. To map the performance measures to a large number of contextual and
operational factors (e.g. network configuration, on-road operating
environment, composition of working time  - normal and penalty) in order to
establish suitable procedures to assist management in implementing change
which is consistent with improving overall productivity.
TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE CONTROLS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF PRIVATISATION
Privatisation and deregulation of transport operations and facilities vis-a-vis land
use and transport planning were not systematically explored in the conference.
However, they came up repeatedly as important concerns which need to be
addressed in future conferences.  The key issues discussed are outlined below.
Despite the acknowledged primary relationship between transport and land use, its
systematic observation and analysis have remained secondary.  This has been
due, in part, to the difficulties involved such as the variety of institutional settings
and regulations in which land use planning and zoning is done, and their immense
political sensitivity.
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in the form of 'impact fees' assessed on developers at the time of issuing building
permits.  In return the city (or a government entity) obligates itself to building a
particular facility within a specified time or to refund the money.  They introduce a
private instrument in planning for growth but are limited in scope and effect. In spite
of the recognition of externalities, impact fees do not affect the planning of major
transport arterials, which is a government function.  Governments regard them as a
tax to be raised to help finance roads which are already on the planning books.
The conference took the question:  why has the planning process failed to deal
effectively with both negative and positive externalities of transportation? This is
despite the planners' rational approach:  define, quantify and predict them, avoid or
ameliorate them by means of planning and technology, gauge monetary values for
them in order to compensate harm, internalise them in a benefit-cost calculus, and
engage in participatory planning to gain agreement on a course of action to be
implemented.
Since the freeway revolt in the early 70's, the planning process and procedures
have been fragile and vulnerable to challenge.  Using both the planning process
and the court system the interests representing negative externalities have been
successful in vetoing, delaying, shelving, but also improving the planned facilities.
The dilemmas effected by negative (and positive) externalities are exacerbated,
and some would say caused, by the lack of markets for them.  The central issues
concern both equity and values:  in what form (e.g. money; personal, local and
global health effects; values such as aesthetics or historical preservation, etc.),
when, and who suffer the consequences?  An unintended by-product of the well-
intended comprehensiveness of planning has been its bureaucratisation and
inefficiency.  In order to satisfy planning requirements a transport planner has to
cover issues from design standards and travel demands to preservation of
threatened species and historical landmarks.
How, then should planning be organised so as to be relevant to individuals'
decisions and choices? In particular, could internalisation of the externalities and
'market place'-type decision making be accomplished by privatising planning?  If
privatisation of planning is desirable, in what kind of institutional framework should
it operate?  What issues, if any, should be left for the government?
Economic markets have proved remarkably effective in providing people with the
goods and services they desire.  Land use and transport planning have faltered in
accounting for externalities; government policy instruments designed to correct for
them are causing unaffordability of housing and transportation.  An important
question raised in the conference was:  because public planning seems to fail, can
internalisation of externalities and affordability of housing and transportation be
accomplished by privatising planning ?
NEED FOR A THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION
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In spite of knowledge and persuasive theoretical arguments, many attempts to
introduce innovative transport strategies such as road pricing have met with major
bureaucratic and political barriers. Road pricing for example illustrates the problem
of translating concepts into actual policies. It produced one try in the 30 years after
the principles were worked out around 1960.!  A similar fate has met with many
other innovative policies. During the same time period, and even longer, transport,
housing, pollution, economic development, and other problems have been
successfully tackled only in a few, if any, societies.  World wide aid agencies
dealing with these problems, the World Bank, United Nations, and others, as well
as the regional planning agencies, all claiming to apply modern theories to help
people and improve the environment, have developed into expansive
bureaucracies.  The efficacy of their policies and planning methods remains in
serious doubt.  Should the patient place his hopes for cure with the charisma of the
doctor?
The state of the affairs calls for better theories of technique and better planning
practice.  Static theories can be made dynamic if they serve both as a method of
application and as a method of investigation of the experiments conducted.
Privatisation and deregulation, the theme of the conference, serve these purposes
because they open up new perspectives and provide new data from previously
untried policies.  Current understanding of the market processes involved in
privatisation and deregulation of passenger transport point to the need for fresh
approaches and for questioning the present methods of planning transportation and
land use.
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Keynote Paper: Reform in Passenger Transport: The Next Step, Michael Beesley,
London Business School, United Kingdom.
Plenary Session 1:
International Experience in Competitive Tendering, Wendell Cox and Jean Love,
Wendell Cox Consultancy, USA.
Introductional Road Pricing: Possibilities and Difficulties, Dan Nasman, The Swedish
Road Administration, Sweden.
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the New Economic Conditions, Michail Ulitskyi, Automobile and Roads Construction
Institute, USSR.
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Contracting Process in New Zealand,  Ian Wallis, Travers Morgan, New Zealand.
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Barriers to Market Entry: Practical Experiences of UK Bus Market, Harry Blundred,
Transit Holdings, United Kingdom.
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Yannis Katsoulacos, The University of Liverpool, United Kingdom.
Airline Entry and Competition in New Zealand, Gordon Mills, University of Sydney,
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Their Relevance? Chris Nash, The University of Leeds.
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Impact of Deregulation and Privatization of the UK Bus Industry on the Labour Force,
Philip Heseltine, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom.
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Transit Deregulation and Market Structure, Yossi Berechman, Tel Aviv University,
Israel.
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Transportation and Urban Growth Management - Possibilities for Real Balance,
Douglass Lee, US Department of Transportation, USA.
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Congestion Charges,  Timothy Hau, World Bank, USA.
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Technological Developments in Road Pricing, Peter Hills, University of Newcastle upon
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Pricing, Financing and Ownership of Roads in a Free Society, Gabriel Roth, Consultant,
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USA.
Road Investment with Road Pricing - Investment and Revenue/Cost Issues, Odd Larsen,
Institute of Transport Economics, Norway.
Workshop 6:  Public Transport, Experience with Corporatization, Deregulation and
Privatization
Chair Nigel Wilson, MIT, USA
The Japanese Experience with Urban Private Rail Companies: Idiosyncratix or
Examplary, Ken'ichi Shoji, Kobe University, Japan.
The Economics of Private vs. Public Provision of Bus Transit Service Kofi Obeng, North
Carolina State University, USA.
Structural Reform in New Zealand's Passenger Transport Industry, Fiona Knight,
Transit New Zealand, New Zealand.
Commercially Viable Bus Services are Encouraged by Legislation in NSW Australia,
Roger Graham, Roger Graham & Associates, Australia.
Deregulation of Public Transport in Sweden, Kjell Jansson and Bosse Wallin, Stockholm
Transport, Sweden.
